This May marks the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of Romania. In recent years, Marxist historians have done much to study the Romanian revolutionary movement. Emphasizing the importance of the heroic struggle of the Romanian proletariat, they analyze the reasons for the achievements and shortcomings of the movement in the past, the strengths and weaknesses of the movement, expose the Western bourgeois falsifiers of the history of the Communist Party of Romania, who are trying to slander the left wing of the Socialist Party of Romania (SPR)1, which stood on the position of unconditional accession of the newly created Communist Party of Romania to the Leninist Third International, pass off as true revolutionaries Romanian right and center 2 .

To date, serious research has accumulated a considerable collection of collections of documents, 3 materials from the revolutionary press have been identified, 4 general sketches of the history of the working-class movement in Romania , 5 as well as works devoted to certain periods and problems in the history of the Communist Party of Romania are available .6
1 Until the end of 1918. It was called the Social Democratic Party of Romania (SDPR).

2 G. Ionescu. Communism in Romania. 1944 - 1962. L. 1964, pp. 2 - 4, 7, 9; "East-Central Europe under the Communists. Romania". N. Y. 1967, p. 68.

3 "Documents din istoria Partidului comunist din Romania". Vol. 1 - 4. Bucuresti. 1956 - 1958; "Amintiri despre primul congres al Partidului (8 - 12 mai 1921)". Bucuresti. 1956; "Documente din istoria Uniunii tineretului Comunist din Romania, 1917 - 1944". Bucuresti. 1958; "Patruzeci de ani de la luptele din 13 decembrie. 1918 - 1958". Bucuresti. 1958; "Greva generala din Romania. 1920". Bucuresti. 1960; "Documente din istoria miscarii muncitoresti din Romania. 1916 - 1921". Bucuresti. 1966; "Marea Revolutie Socialists din Octombrie si miscarea revolufionara sj democratica din Romania. Documente si amintiri". Bucuresti. 1967; "Documente din istoria miscarii muncitoresti din Romania. 1910 - 1915". Bucuresti. 1968; "Monarhia de Hohenzollern vazuta de contemporani. Antologie". Bucuresti. 1968; "Documente din istoria partidului comunist si a miscarii muncitoresti revolutionare din Romania (mai 1921 - august 1924)". Bucuresti. 1970; "Lenin vazut de romani. Documente si aminitiri". Bucuresti. 1970; " Under the banner of proletarian internationalism. Activities of Romanian internationalists on the territory of the Country of Soviets. 1917-1920". Collection of documents and materials. Moscow, 1970.

4 T. Georgescu, M. Ioanid. Presa P.C.R. si organizatiilor sale de masa. 1921 - 1944. (Przentare bibliografica). Bucuresti. 1963.

5 "Lectii in ajutorul celor care studiaza istoria P.M.R.". Bucuresti. 1961; A. Deac, I. Ilincioiu. Lenin si Romania. Bucuresti. 1970; O. Matichescu, E. Georgescu. I Mai in Romania. 1890 - 1970. Bucuresti. 1970.

6 T. Georgescu. De la greva generala la crearea P.C.R. Bucuresti. 1962; ejusd. Organizatii de masa legale conduse de P.C.R. 1923 - 1934. Bucuresti. 1967; "Momente din istoria Partidului Comunist Poman". Bucuresti. 1968; M. C. Stanescu. Ch. M. Vasilescu. Bucuresti. 1968; N.Petreanu si D.Baran. I. C. Frimu. Bucuresti. 1969; G. Ionescu. Alexandru Constantinescu. Bucuresti. 1970; "Greva generala din Romania. 1920". Bucuresti. 1970; V. Liveanu. "Pravda" despre miscarea revolutionary din Romania (1917- 1921), "Studii", 1967, N 5; N. Ccpoiu. Socialisti romani la Zimmerwald. "Magazin istoric", 1967, N 2; "Alianta clasei muncitoare cu taranimea mundtoare in Romania". Bucu-

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Marxist historiography notes a number of features, as well as difficulties, that took place in the development of the revolutionary process in Romania, while confirming that it proceeded in accordance with general historical patterns. Among the features that contributed to the development of the revolutionary movement in Romania at the beginning of the 20th century was the influence of the revolutionary movement in Russia, as well as the influence of the ideology and policies of the workers ' parties of neighboring countries (primarily the Bolshevik-Leninists, as well as the Bulgarian close Socialists and the Serbian left Social Democrats). At the same time, one of the features that hindered the development of the working - class movement in Romania in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the country's industrial backwardness. Under these circumstances, the relatively weak spread of Marxism in Romania at the end of the 19th century (compared to some neighboring countries) and the influence of narodnik ideas made it difficult to form revolutionary cadres who were in the position of revolutionary Marxism.

The promotion of reformist ideas by the social-democratic leaders in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, along with the revolutionary ones, certainly had a certain impact on the activities of the Romanian Social-Democrat during this period. The spread in the Romanian labor movement at the beginning of the twentieth century of the essentially reformist views of C. Dobrogeanu-Geri (the theory of "neo-feudalism" and the theory of "socialism in backward countries"), which incorrectly considered the problem of the correlation of general laws and national characteristics of the historical development of Romania, condemned the proletariat to inaction, to ignore the revolutionary power of the peasantry, and prevented the creation of the Union of workers and peasants, assigned to the working class the role of assistant to the bourgeoisie7 .

In contrast to the opportunists, left-wing elements in the Romanian labor movement already in the first decade of the twentieth century supported the slogan of active revolutionary action, sought to get acquainted with the revolutionary experience of the Bolshevik Party and the Bulgarian "narodniaks", were active propagandists of the slogan of the revolutionary union of the proletariat of the Balkan countries, a slogan supported by V. I. Lenin8, and during the First World War the social-chauvinists, against the domestic opportunists who supported the policy of the bourgeoisie, fought for the ideology and policy of proletarian internationalism. It was they who created the Communist Party, which joined the ranks of the international communist movement.

* * *

Even during the years of Lenin's Iskra, the left-wing elements of the Romanian workers ' movement approved the position of the Bolsheviks, who fought against Russian and international opportunism .9 During the Russian Revolution of 1905-1907. they actively supported the proletariat of Russia. By-

resti. 1969; St. Musat. Miscarea muncitoreasca in anii avtntului revolutionar. Grearea Partidului Comunist Roman (1918 - 1921), "Anale de istorie", 1969, N 3; I. Apostol. Activitatea si personalitatea lui V. I. Lenin oglindite in ziarul "Socialismub (1918 - 1921), "Studii", 1970, N 2; Н. Гогоняцэ. Dissemination of Leninist ideas in Romania. "Leninism and modern problems of historical and philosophical science", Moscow, 1970; E. I. Spivakovsky. The Creation of the Communist Party - the historical victory of Leninism over opportunism and Reformism in the Romanian labor Movement (1917-1921)," The October Revolution and Proletarian Internationalism", Moscow, 1970.

7 V. N. Vinogradov. Romania in the years of the First World War. Moscow, 1969, p. 25. "History of Romania of the new and modern times". Moscow, 1964, p. 89-93.

8 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 22, p. 136 - 138, 142, 155, 198, 202 - 203.

9 See Yu. Ya. Baskin, E. I. Spivakovsky. Lenin's Iskra in Romania. "On the Lenin way "("Scientific Notes". Leningradskaya VPSh. Issue 2). L. 1970, pp. 90-92, 102-104.

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the demise of the revolutionary movement in Romania and the influence of the Russian revolutionary events contributed to the intensification of the ideological struggle, the struggle between two trends in the Romanian labor movement .10
The revolutionary upsurge of 1905-1907 set forth the task of creating a revolutionary proletarian party in Rumania. Dissolved by opportunists and renegades in 1899, the Social-Democratic Party was not re-established until 1910. In its ranks, the struggle between two trends continued - the left and the opportunist. An example of the latter is the position of K. Dobrogeanu-Gehry, who negatively assessed the experience of the Russian revolution of 1905-190711 .

At the same time, centrist ideas of unity (at any cost) between the left and the opportunists were in circulation in the ranks of the SDPR. The most prominent representative of this trend was X. Rakovsky, who sought the unification of the Bulgarian "small towns" with the "broad ones" and advocated the unity of the working-class movement in the Balkans at the price of concessions to the opportunists.

Thanks to the struggle of the left (A. Ionescu, M. G. Bujor, A. Constantinescu and others) the ideas of revolution, the ideas of internationalism stubbornly fought their way. In 1909, the Romanian socialists, together with the Bulgarian "tesniaks" and the left-wing Serbian social Democrats, held a conference of Balkan social democratic parties .12
At the extraordinary congress of the SDPR in August 1914, the chairman A. Constantinescu and other leftists spoke out against Romania's entry into the imperialist war. The left, as in 1912, put forward the slogan "War on war". A. Constantinescu was convinced that Romania should not join either one or the other imperialist group. Constantinescu and other leftists considered the path of revolution to be the only means of solving the problems of national reunification of Romanians, and the main reason for the collapse of the Second International was "the rule of opportunism" .13 This point of view was close to the position of V. I. Lenin. By a majority vote, the Congress adopted the resolution of the center-right majority, whose position in Zimmerwald was close to the German "center" .14 However, it was thanks to the left that the party remained generally internationalist during the war.

In the summer of 1915, during the First World War, at the Second Balkan Conference of Social-Democratic Parties, the Romanian socialists joined the Federation of Balkan Social-Democratic Parties organized at that time and reaffirmed their loyalty to the internationalist slogan of the struggle for the revolutionary unity of the Balkan peoples. At the conference, A. Constantinescu and D. Marinescu criticized C. Dobrogeanu-Geru for his position of "defending the fatherland", and also objected to the centrist position of Rakovsky .15
In September 1915, the SDPR took part in the Cim conference-

10 See V. N. Vinogradov. The Peasant Uprising of 1907 in Romania, Moscow, 1958; A. E. Novak. The first bourgeois-democratic Revolution and the Revolutionary movement in Romania (1905-1907). Chisinau. 1966; E. I. Spivakovsky. The rise of the revolutionary movement in Romania at the beginning of the 20th century, Moscow, 1958; N. Copoiu. Refacerea Partidului social-democrat din Romania (1900 - 1910). Btucuresti. 1966. See also PhD thesis: A. K. Mosanu. The labor Movement and the Struggle between two Tendencies in the Social Democratic Party of Romania (1910-1914). Moscow, 1966.

11K. Dobrogeanu-Gerea did not understand the alignment of class forces in the Russian revolution, condemned the activities of the Bolsheviks, and considered the" tactics of the socialist revolution in Russia " incorrect (see Romania muncitoare, 4-11 martie 1907. Archive Of The Plekhanov House, A.D. 2/113. I, A.D. 5/347. I).

12 See V. I. Lenin, PSS. Vol. 22, pp. 136-138, 142, 155.

13 N. Huscariu. Alexandru Constantinescu. Bucuresti. 1970, pp. 42, 43.

14 TSPA IML, f. 72, op. 3, units hr. 301, l. 88.

15 N. Copoiu. Afirmarea aripii de stinga din PSDR in anii 1914 - 1916. "Analele...", 1964, N 1, p. 46.

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mervalde. Its delegate was H. Rakovsky, who had openly proclaimed centrist slogans a year earlier. On the eve of the Zimmerwald Conference, he published (together with Sh. Dumas) wrote a pamphlet entitled "Socialists and War", in which he criticized open opportunists, but he himself called for "speaking out both against the war and against sabotage of national defense."16 This was a clear centrism, and V. I. Lenin believed that "with such people we are not on the road" 17 .

At the Zimmerwald Conference, Rakovsky opposed the Zimmerwald left led by Lenin . Rakovsky's position (as well as that of many other opportunists) confirmed Lenin's conclusion: "The new division of socialists (according to internationalism) corresponds to the old one (according to opportunism) ..." 19 Later describing the position of the Romanian centrists, A. Nicolau wrote: "The Center (Rakovsky), after the justification of the French and German socialists in their defense of the fatherland at the beginning of the war, will evolve to Trotsky's position on questions of war. "20
H. Rakovsky identified the documents adopted by the Zimmerwald Conference with the position of consistent internationalism and accordingly assessed the position of the SDPR leadership and the party as a whole .21 V. I. Lenin, as is well known, believed that Zimmerwald's documents were of a compromise nature, and that the position of the Zimmerwald majority was inconsistent. The position of the consistent internationalists - the Zimmerwald left, as is well known, was set out in the draft documents submitted by V. I. Lenin. Rakovsky's position differed from Lenin's in that, according to A. Nicolau's just conclusion, the majority in the SDPR and its leadership as a whole, "limiting themselves to the publication of the Zimmerwald and Kintal manifestos, did not completely abandon the opportunist point of view on "national defense".22
In a different way, A. Constantinescu assessed the results of the Zimmerwald Conference from a left-wing revolutionary position, considering them as "... a step forward towards Marxist revolutionary socialism " 23, but considering, however, that the conference did not indicate "practical means" of fighting the war.

16 In August 1914. Rakovsky "fully approved" the policy of the German social-traitors in the Reichstag, supported passive tactics, for renouncing the revolutionary struggle, and considered the slogan "defense of the fatherland" possible (V. N. Vinogradov. Romania during the First World War, pp. 103, 104).

17 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 49, p. 117.

18 Rakovsky's centrist position is described in detail in Lenin's documents. See V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 49, pp. 117-119; vol. 26, p. 324; "Lenin and the International Working-class Movement", Moscow, 1969, p. 252. See also V. N. Vinogradov. Op. ed., p. 103; N. E. Korolev. The Bolsheviks at the Zimmerwald Conference. "Questions of the History of the CPSU", 1965, No. 9, pp. 13, 17; L. A. Slepov, Ya. G. Temkin. International Conference of Socialists in Zimmerwald (based on new materials). "New and recent History", 1965, N 5, pp. 24, 28, 32, 33; Ya. G. Temkin. Lenin and International Social Democracy. 1914-1917. Moscow, 1968, p. 233; A. Reisberg. Lenin und die Zimmerwalder Bewegung. B. 1966, S. 175, 176. And Lenin's and other documents (see V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 49, p. 163; N. E. Korolev. Lenin and the International Labor Movement. 1914-1917. Moscow, 1968, p. 79; TSPA IML, f. 72, op. 3, ed. chr. 301, ll. 71-72, 89-90; "Lenin and the International Labor Movement", pp. 256, 274) show that Rakovsky was not a member of the Zimmerwald left, and there is no reason to consider his position in Zimmerwald to be close to that of V. V. Lenin. I. Lenin (cf.: St. Voicu. Constantin Dobrogeanu-Cherea. "Anale de istorie", 1970, N 3, p. 13).

19 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 26, p. 250.

20 CP IML, f. 72, op. 3, units hr. 301, ll. 71-72.

21 См. "Documente din istoria miscarii muncitoresti din Romania. 1916-1921" (hereinafter - "Documente. 1916 - 1921"), Bucuresti. 1966, pp. 9 - 11, 20 - 24 etc.

22 TSPA IML, f. 72, op. 3, units hr. 301, l. 120.

23 "Lupta zilnica". 1 aprilie 1916 (N. Copoiu. Op. cit., p. 53).

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In the course of the further struggle of the left against the right and centrists, a certain process of ideological formation of the left was outlined during this period. Their articles and speeches at rallies also speak about this.

A. Constantinescu, Dr. X. Aroneanu, G. M. Vasilescu-Vasia (editor of the newspaper "Lupta zilnica"), G. G. Niculescu-Mizil (editor of the workers 'newspaper" Federatia"), E. Arbore, K. Ivanus and others called for an active struggle from class positions .24
On June 13, 1916, an anti-war demonstration was shot in Galac. The Romanian proletariat responded with strikes and protest rallies. On the day of Romania's entry into the war, August 14 (27), 1916, a protest rally was held in Bucharest, which was attended by 5 thousand people .25 The government unleashed repressions on the working class, on the SDPR, on the workers ' press, which propagated the ideas of the revolution.

In August 1916, the first reports about the Zimmerwald left appeared in the Romanian workers ' press, and its consistently revolutionary position was noted .26 In 1916, an arbitration commission was established under the chairmanship of A. Constantinescu, which condemned the opportunistic activities of Christescu, who served as secretary of the Party's Executive Committee after Romania entered the war, and his opposition to the "new principles of Zimmerwald tactics"27 . Although the left faced a number of difficulties in implementing the "Zimmerwald tactics", 28 they maintained the general line of struggle for an internationalist understanding of the party's tasks.

The ranks of the Romanian left were few and far between during the first World imperialist War, and the difficulties of the struggle were increasing. In addition, the lack of proper ideological training, political experience, and the presence of old, long-lived traditions further complicated the task that the left set for itself. "It is not easy to be an internationalist in practice in the era of the terrible imperialist war," wrote V. I. Lenin. "There are not many such people, but only in them is the whole future of socialism, only they are the leaders of the masses, and not the corrupters of the masses." 29 The Romanian left enthusiastically greeted the news of the victory of the Great October Revolution and made the right conclusion: "What we demand has already been implemented in Russia... We are not alone in this struggle... Long live Lenin's revolutionary socialism!"30 .

* * *

The victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, in which Romanian revolutionaries were eyewitnesses and in some cases participants, convincingly demonstrated the world-historical significance of the Russian revolutionary experience, which was immediately noted by the Romanian revolutionary movement31-Lenin's works translated and published in Roumania32 convinced M. Bujor, A. Nicolau and other Romanian leftists socialists are convinced of the need to study and use this experience creatively. Brought up on the ideas of the revolutionary mar-

24 N. Copoiu. Op. cit., p. 52.

25 Ya. G. Temkin. Op. ed., p. 477.

26 N. Copoiu. Op. cit., p. 53.

27 N. Copoiu. Op. cit., p. 57.

28 V. Liveanu. 1918. Bucuresti. 1960, p. 121.

29 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 31, pp. 174-175.

30 "Documente. 1916 - 1921", pp. 73 - 74.

31 "Un an de la revolujia rusa". S. L. 1918. In: "Documente din istoria P.C.R. Vol. I. 1917 - 1922" (далее - "Documente. 1917 - 1922"). Bucuresti. 1955, pp. 67 - 89; Al. Nicolau. Revolujia socialists in Romania. Moscova. 1919.

32 P. Constantinescu-Jasi, V. Cherestesiu, L. Jordaky. LucrSri si publicatii din Romania despre Marea revolujie socialists din Octombrie (1917 - 1944). Bucuresti. 1967, pp. 85 - 106; "Lenin vazut de romanb, pp. 643 - 652.

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The Romanian leftists were the initiators and organizers of the struggle for the creation of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and for its accession to the Communist International.

The ideological position of the Romanian Military Revolutionary Committee in Odessa, which published the newspaper "Lupta", and other Romanian communist organizations in Soviet Russia was briefly expressed in two slogans: "Long live the Russian Revolution... Long live the Romanian revolution!"33 . With full consciousness of their historical mission, the Romanian revolutionaries took up arms in the ranks of the internationalists who fought together with the peoples of Soviet Russia against the interventionists who seized Soviet Bessarabia .34 By proclaiming the slogan "Our revolution begins", they inextricably linked the resistance to the invaders with the class battles in their country .35
Let us add that the RCP (b) and the Soviet Government, expressing the will of the revolutionary people of Soviet Russia, have officially declared their support for the Rumanian revolutionaries: "Every Rumanian soldier, worker, and peasant will find support for the Russian Soviet government against the arbitrariness of the reactionary Rumanian bureaucracy." 36 The Party and Soviet organs provided political and material support to the Romanian internationalists in Soviet Russia .37
Of great importance for the propaganda of Lenin's ideas of revolution and the experience of the Soviet Republic was the publication and distribution among Romanians in Soviet Russia, as well as the sending to Romania of internationalist publications, especially newspapers published in various cities of Soviet Russia in 1917-1920. (in Moscow, Astrakhan, Odessa, Omsk, Samara, and Kharkiv) 38 .

Romanian internationalists considered defending the gains of the October Revolution to be their main task. At the same time, there was another, no less important aspect of their activities - preparation for returning to their homeland to conduct revolutionary work there .39 In the spring of 1918, at the initiative of A. Constantinescu, the left created its own leadership center in the country - the illegal Action Committee 40 .

The May Day Manifesto of 1918, published in Romania and signed by a group of Leftists (the "Bolshevik group"), spoke of preparing the vanguard of the working class for the main task of" socialist revolution "and called for"international solidarity of the proletariat." 41
These days, the question was also raised about the new SDPR program. The decision to develop a new program was made at a meeting on May 1, 1918, which was attended by members of the Executive Committee, representatives of the Bucharest Party Committee, and a number of other organizations. This is the solution

33 "Documente. 1916 - 1921", p. 83.

34 "Lupta", 10/23/ianuarie 1918.

35 V. N. Vinogradov. Two appeals of the Roumanian social-Democrats to revolutionary Russia. Voprosy Istorii, 1967, No. 1, pp. 81-82.

36 "Documents of the Foreign policy of the USSR", Vol. I. Moscow, 1957, p. 67

37 TsGAOR, f. 412, op. 1, d. PO, l. 11; d. 124, l. 191; d. 149, l. 336; V. Rozhko. A battle-hardened friendship. Romanian internationalists in the Great October Socialist Revolution and the Civil War in the USSR (1917-1920). Chisinau. 1965; same name. Romanian revolutionary detachments in the south of Soviet Russia (January-April 1918). In: "Internationalists in the Battles for Soviet power", Moscow, 1965; M. A. Birman, V. M. Rozhko. Romanian internationalists. In: "Internationalists. Working people of foreign countries-participants in the struggle for Soviet power", Moscow, 1967.

38 A. K. Strizhkova. Press of foreign internationalists in Soviet Russia (1917-1920). "Internationalists in the battles for Soviet power", p. 382.

39 "Foaia taranului", 28.IV.1918.

40 "The history of modern and contemporary Romania", p. 162.

41 "Documente. 1917-1922", p. 49.

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it was adopted unanimously 42 . It was also decided to submit the new program to the Party Congress for approval "as soon as possible". The decision of the meeting did not imply a consensus of views on the basis of the future new program. Titel Petrescu, one of the leaders of the right in the SDPR, who spoke at the meeting, "spoke out against the revolutionary program and tactics." 43 Members of the party's Executive Committee, I. Moscovia and G. Cristescu, took a centrist position in the ongoing struggle on program issues .

Revolutionary slogans, calls for the establishment of a socialist system, and for armed insurrection are increasingly common in the leaflets of the summer of 1918. The word "Bolshevism" was also used, first in quotation marks, and then in combination with the epithet "Romanian" .45 At about the same time, the Romanian Communist Group operating in Moscow (a section of the Federation of Foreign Groups under the Central Committee of the RCP (b)) was trying to establish close ties with the revolutionaries at home. Stefan Cotescu, who established contact between the Romanian group of the RCP (b) and the leftists operating in the country, 46 as well as the group's secretary , M. Guiu, were sent illegally to Romania. Transylvanian prisoners of war who were returning from Soviet Russia became the vehicles of Bolshevik ideas .47
In the context of the intensified struggle among the Romanian socialists on program issues, the development of a program document by the Moscow group was of great importance. This assignment was given by the Romanian Communist Group to one of its leaders, A. Nicolau. His pamphlet "The Socialist Revolution in Romania" (which should be considered a statement not of his personal point of view, but of the opinion of the entire organization that discussed its main provisions) was written in the summer of 1918,48 and published without changing the text in early 1919.

The experience of the October Revolution, the left concluded, had shown that only the dictatorship of the proletariat could finally defeat the bourgeoisie. Only the power of the Soviets - the power of the workers and peasants-can " strengthen the socialist state." And only this power can destroy those who " raise their hand against the revolutionary proletariat." The leftists in Soviet Russia, following K. Dobrogeanu-Gerey, believed that on the eve of the World War Romania was facing " a bourgeois, capitalist revolution." This thesis of the author of the theory of "neo-serfdom", they believed, should now be changed. The left believed that a "rapid movement of the socialist revolution "" would be inevitable on the second Day after the overthrow of the monarchy and the declaration of a republic." This, they argued, would be facilitated ("accelerated") by"objective and subjective conditions, both domestic and international." The left correctly concluded that Romania's" vital problems ""can only be solved through a socialist revolution." However, considering:-

42 Ec. Arbor-Rally. The Socialist Movement in Romania. "Communist International", 1919, N 7-8, stb. 1029.

43 "The History of Modern and contemporary Romania", p. 162. T. Petrescu, defending reformist tactics, suggested replacing the Action Committee with a more moderate body (V. N. Vinogradov. Romania during the First World War, p. 319).

44 According to V. Liveanu, while proclaiming the program of socialist transformations, they did not want to commit themselves to fight for their implementation (V. Liveanu. 1918, pp. 264 - 265).

45 V. N. Vinogradov. Op. ed., pp. 320-321.

46 CPA IML, f. 17, op. 4, unit hr. 103, l. 2 (in the document mistakenly: Shofron Kotescu).

47 TSPA IML, f. 549, op. 1, ed. hr. 19, l. 42; V. Liveanu. 1918, p. 439.

48 See E. I. Spivakovsky. Great October and Romania. "History of the USSR", 1968, N 6, p. 173.

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They did not take into account the necessity of a certain period of struggle for the completion of bourgeois-democratic transformations. The left correctly answered the question of why power should pass into the hands of the proletariat. This section of A. Nicolau's work opened with a reference to Lenin's famous April theses and quotes from Letters on Tactics about the need for a creative, scientific approach to solving the problems of the class struggle .49
However, the left did not understand an important point in the experience of the Russian revolution, did not understand the idea of a union of the proletariat and peasantry, and failed to apply this experience to the concrete Romanian reality. From the struggle of the Bolsheviks against the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries, they drew the wrong conclusion about the impossibility of an alliance with the petty bourgeoisie in general, failed to grasp a number of the most important features of Lenin's strategy and tactics in the revolution, and failed to understand the necessity of a revolutionary-democratic stage of revolution for a country like Romania. The "leftism" of some of the program's ideas was still determined by insufficient theoretical maturity and lack of political experience.

The last section of the left's program was the section "For the Party of the Revolution." The first task of the left was to " thoroughly organize and strengthen the party." They considered it necessary to establish "iron discipline" and condemned class cooperation. They considered it necessary to abandon the old name of the party and call the party Communist Party . And although the left set out to fight for a new party on the model of the RCP (b), this poorly developed section of their program showed that they had not yet conceived the questions of party building in the most general form, that this most urgent question had not yet been developed by them in essence.

At the same time, the erroneous views of the Rumanian left on a number of issues could not erase the great revolutionary significance of certain program propositions put forward by them, which testified to the assimilation of a number of elements of Leninism and, above all, to the necessity and regularity of the socialist revolution, to the necessity and regularity of the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat in Rumania. The promotion and justification of these propositions meant a departure from the program principles of the parties of the Second International, and the beginning of the development of a new, communist-type party program.

Along with the development of fundamental program provisions in the activities of the Romanian left socialists in the country and the Romanian communists in Russia, propaganda of the experience of building the first Soviet state was of great importance. In July 1918, the "Constitution of the Russian Revolution "was published in Transylvania (Sibiu), as well as in Moscow by the Romanian Communist Group (the pamphlet" Constitution of the RSFSR " was published in a circulation of 15 thousand copies). Materials on the Soviet Constitution were published in 1918-1919 in the newspapers Glasul poporului, Revolutia sociala, Scinteia, and Socialismul51 . These materials contributed to the propaganda of Lenin's ideas, helped to fight ideological opponents. In promoting the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat by the Romanian left, it was of great importance to show what the new government had practically done in Soviet Russia, how Lenin's ideas were being implemented, and what the results of Lenin's policy were for changing the lives of previously exploited workers.

On May 19, 1918, leftists who signed themselves "The Soviet of Bolshevik Workers and Soldiers" declared in a leaflet:: "The Russian workers saw it well,

49 Al. Nicolau. Op. cit, pp. 5 - 7, 13, 34, 67, 74, 78 - 79.

50 Al. Nicolau. Op. cit., p. 86.

51 P. Constantinescu - Iasis. a. Op. cit., pp. 32, 66, 87, 160, 168; "Documente. 1917 - 1922", p. 105.

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that only the revolution that overthrew Russian capitalism would bring them happiness. And they did it. This revolution gave land to the peasants and factories to the workers... The Russian Revolution serves as an example and model for us. Romania must become a socialist republic!", and in June 1918, the left-wing group" Bolshevik Federation of Romania "wrote that"the Russian revolution has raised a beacon of socialist ideas" 52 .

In this regard, the attempts of the Romanian left - wing communist groups to analyze the revolutionary experience of Russia are very important. This work was initiated by Ariton Pescaru, one of the organizers and leaders of the Romanian Communist Group in Moscow53 , and was carried out in the already mentioned pamphlet by A. Nicolau (sections "What the Russian Socialist Revolution has accomplished", "Why power must pass into the hands of the proletariat"). In November 1918, a special pamphlet entitled "The Year of the Russian Revolution" was published, signed "Communist Workers of Romania". It gave a detailed account of the achievements of the socialist revolution, which was accomplished by the "Russian workers led by Lenin." 54 "The Russian Revolution has shown us the road to follow... Bolshevism has taken root everywhere...". An important conclusion was drawn from a review of the situation in Soviet Russia:"We are called upon to do the same work at home . "55" We, "the pamphlet said," no longer demand reforms, but the implementation of our maximum, complete program... In other words, we are Communists. " 56 The pamphlet "The Year of the Russian Revolution" raised the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a program for the Romanian labor movement. The slogan of the Workers 'and Peasants' union, put forward on the basis of Soviet experience, was also very important for Romania.

Lenin's critique of centrism was of great help to the Romanian left in their struggle against the opportunists and in propagating the ideas of the dictatorship of the proletariat. For the Romanian left, this circumstance was of particular practical importance. Lenin's criticism of centrism, and in particular of Rakovsky's Kautskyite position, was well known to them .57 When at the end of 1918 the second edition of the book "The State and the Revolution" was published with a detailed critique of centrism, the Romanian Communist Group in Moscow decided to urgently translate this work of V. I. Lenin into Romanian. In February 1919, A. Nicolau and I. Penza wrote in the report of the Romanian Communist Group on Lenin's book " The State and the Revolution "that"the translation is already ready" 58 .

52 "Documente. 1917 - 1922", pp. 54 - 55, 56.

53 "Analele...", 1959, N 5, p. 98.

54 "Documente. 1917-1922", p. 67. The place of publication of the pamphlet is unknown. The report materials of the Romanian Communist Group indicate that among those prepared for publication was the pamphlet " Nicolau. Anniversary of the Social Revolution "(TSPA IML, f. 549, op. 1, ed. chr. 14, l. 81). V. N. Vinogradov considers this booklet a collective work (V. N. Vinogradov. Op. ed., pp. 330-331).

55 "Documente. 1917 - 1922", pp. 68, 82.

56 Ibid., pp. 86-87. V. N. Vinogradov rightly notes that these calls reflected the Romanian left's underestimation of the need to complete bourgeois-democratic reforms, a wrong, nihilistic attitude to reforms, explaining these incorrect views of the authors of the pamphlet "The Year of the Russian Revolution" by the fact that " a heroic impulse distracted its authors from earth calculations" (V. N. Vinogradov. Op. ed., pp. 330-331).

57 Now, in 1918, they were convinced that Lenin's assessment of the philosophical foundations of Kautskyism (see V. I. Lenin's PSS. Vol. 37, p. 242) textually almost completely coincides with the characterization of the centrist position of X. Rakovsky in his work " Socialism and War "(see V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 26, p. 324).

58 CP IML, f. 549, op. 1, unit hr. 14, l. 81-81 vol. For some unknown reason, the translation was not published in 1919.

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The ideas of this Leninist work, as well as the book "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky", were very relevant for the Romanian working-class movement, which was deciding on a new program. The renegade Kautsky denied that the Great October Socialist Revolution was a manifestation of historical regularity, and claimed that this revolution was an accident in the Russian and world historical process. Similar thoughts were expressed in Romania by C. Dobrogeanu-Gerey, who tried to "explain" the proletarian revolution, which had already been carried out in an "underdeveloped country", as an "exception", as a "temporary phenomenon"59 .

The thesis on the dictatorship of the proletariat in the new (December 1918) draft of the CPR program ("Declaration of Principles") objectively opposed the position of Kautsky and his followers.

The Romanian right-wing socialists, led by Fluerasz and Jumanca, who signed the declaration of Transylvania's annexation to Romania, adopted in Alba Iulia on December 1, 1918, promising "the full implementation of a purely democratic regime in all spheres of public life," 60 covered the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie with the fig leaf of "supra-class democracy," and disoriented the less class-conscious part of the working class they sowed illusions of the class world 61 .

While promoting revolutionary ideas and tactics, the left publishes communist propaganda literature and distributes it at home. Lenin's works were published: a report on the activities of the Council of People's Commissars on January 11(24), 1918, "The Power of the Soviets and the Crisis in Germany", A. Kollontai's pamphlet "Who are the Communists", a large number of leaflets, and A. Constantinescu's" Book of Slaves". In May 1918, the Romanian Communist Group opened courses for agitators in Moscow. In total, 24 people graduated from the special courses of agitators in Romanian and Hungarian created by the Federation of Foreign Groups of the RCP (b). Agitators were sent to Romania, Transylvania and Bessarabia .62
* * *

Draft new JWP program ("Declaration of Principles") It was published on December 9 (22), 1918 in the central organ of the party, the newspaper Socialismul. The Declaration of Principles noted that the October Revolution opened a new revolutionary era, expressed sympathy for the proletariat of Soviet Russia, and declared the main goal of the struggle to be "the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat." The Declaration emphasized the importance of the October experience, condemned the "reformist, opportunist tactics of the socialist parties", "nationalist ideology", and opposed "class cooperation"63 . However, the draft program did not give a clear formulation of the internationalist position that the authors of the document were trying to adopt.

59 C. Mocanu. Cu privire la problema caracterului si sarcinilor revolutiei in Romania oglindite in documente miscarii muncitoresti din anii 1916 - 1918. "Analele...", 1964, N 5, p. 38.

60 "Marea Adunare Nafionala intrunita la Alba Iulia in ziua de l Decemvrie 1918. Acte si documente". S. 1., s. a., p. 11.

61 This position coincided with that of the Kautskyites. V. I. Lenin denounced Kautsky's propaganda of bourgeois "pure democracy" as a liberal perversion of the question. Kautsky, wrote V. I. Lenin, "stands firm on his 'slogan': let the revolution perish, let the bourgeoisie triumph over the proletariat, if only 'pure democracy' flourishes!" (V. I. Lenin, PSS. Vol. 37, pp. 256, 282).

62 "The Eighth Congress of the RCP (b). Protocols", Moscow, 1959, p. 504.

63 "Documente. 1916 - 1921", pp. 123 - 128.

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The absence of these and a number of other provisions in the draft CPR program once again confirmed that the document, with all its advantages, was in a certain sense a compromise. After the publication of the draft of the new program, the ideological struggle in the party did not stop, but became even more acute.

The events of December 13, 1918 also accelerated the division of currents in the SPR - the shooting of a workers ' demonstration in Bucharest and the subsequent brutal repressions, which once again showed the working masses the true face of the Romanian bourgeoisie, which widely advertised its "democratic", "national" policy in connection with the annexation of Transylvania, publicly supported by the right-wing social Democrats in those days. who have entered into direct cooperation with the bourgeois-landlord government.

In a difficult and difficult situation of government repression, on February 13, 1919, the "Declaration" was published, signed by the Provisional Executive Committee of the SPR 64 . The Interim Executive Committee said that the World War "brought us closer" to liberation from national oppression, and welcomed the annexation of new provinces "oppressed until now." Among these provinces, he mentioned Soviet Bessarabia, occupied by the Romanian bourgeoisie and landlords, which was forcibly incorporated into the Romanian Kingdom, which bourgeois-landowner propaganda called "Great Romania", and the Provisional Executive Committee called "New Romania". It took the position of supporting the aggressive policy of the bourgeois-landowner government (the "Declaration" did not even mention that Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina were captured by armed means, against the will of their population), without saying anything about the interests of various classes, about the struggle of national minorities in Romania for their rights, without even mentioning a single word about After all this, the authors of the declaration called themselves internationalists. The declaration of the Provisional Executive Committee was hailed by the leftists of Galac and Braila as "a return back to the treacherous social democracy", while the leftists of Byrlada declared that cooperating with the Romanian oligarchy means "rejecting the ideas of socialism". We, they continued, " will look for principles for guiding the policy of the proletariat not in bourgeois-democratic programs, not in reformist-parliamentary programs, not in socialist-opportunist programs, but in the lessons of Zimmerwald, Kintal, and above all in the lessons of the Russian Revolution." In Ploiesti, the left decided to condemn the" Declaration " of the Provisional Executive Committee. They stressed that the ideas of the "Declaration" lead "to a real idealization of the present imperialist war and capitalist peace," and called for fighting against the opportunists, "for the victory of internationalist socialism." On March 17 (30), 1919, the left - wing organization "Socialist-Communist Party of Breila", in an address addressed to the Conference of Socialists in Bucharest, declared its loyalty to the principles of the December draft program of the party. We, wrote the Brail left, are "unwavering defenders of these principles." They demanded that "all social-democratic mistakes of the past"should be excluded from socialist propaganda .65
While condemning the principles of the" Declaration " of February 13, the left constantly reminded of the need to fight against the occupation of Bessarabia. Pointing out that the Romanian army restored the bourgeois-landlord regime in Bessarabia, suppressed the revolution, and returned the land to the landlords,

64 "Documente. 1916 - 1921", pp. 165 - 167. The Provisional Executive Committee was created after the arrest of a number of leading figures of the SPR, following the shooting of a demonstration on December 13.

65 "Documente. 1917 - 1922", pp. 124 - 126, 131 - 137, 174.

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The committee of the Romanian Communist Group in Odessa called on Romanian soldiers to fraternize with the Russian revolutionary army, unite with the people of Bessarabia in the interests of the revolution, and give them "the opportunity to govern themselves." In the "Immediate Program of the Revolution"published in the spring of 1919 on behalf of the Romanian Communists

A. Nicolau wrote: "Renunciation of any annexation. Only the Soviets of workers, peasants, and soldiers in Transylvania, Banach, Bukovina, and Bessarabia have the sovereign right to decide the fate of their lands. " 66
The Romanian right-wingers, who took nationalist positions and criticized the December draft of the "Declaration of Principles", did not dare, however, openly demand the removal of the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat. At the same time, they approved of the actions of their leaders Fluerash and Zhumanki, who sat in the bourgeois - landowner Provisional Government of Transylvania. They proposed to draw up a program of the SPR that would not mention a word about the significance of Soviet power. In this case, the right enjoyed the support of the centrists, who spoke under the banner of preserving the unity of the party, despite the fact that on this issue the right acted similarly with its colleagues from the Berne International, at whose conference "not a single word was said about the meaning of Soviet power"67 . "Historically, it is incomprehensible how, at the Berne Conference, people who were not officially declared mad could, on the instructions of the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries, talk about the Bolsheviks' struggle against them, but keep silent about their struggle in alliance with the bourgeoisie against the proletariat, " 68 said Vassiliev. I. Lenin in March 1919 at the First Congress of the Comintern. This Leninist assessment became widely known in Romania thanks to the publication in the same year of 1919 of his theses and report on bourgeois democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat in Romanian .69
In the days of preparation for the convocation of the First Congress of the Comintern, when V. I. Lenin, in a letter to G. V. Chicherin on December 27 (or 28), 1918, outlined a list of future participants in the congress, he referred the "Rumanian Party" to the group of parties "already standing on the basis of the Third International and sufficiently solidary for the formal foundation of the Third International".parties that are close to this, from which we expect rapprochement and merger." The fact that V. I. Lenin did not place the SPR as a whole in the third group ("groups and trends within social-patriotic parties that are more or less close to Bolshevism") indicates his rather high assessment of the influence of left-wing forces in the SPR (perhaps he also had information about the December draft of the Declaration of Principles). At the same time, referring the SPR to the second group, V. I. Lenin, apparently, was not sure of the absolute correctness of this assessment, because after the words "Romanian Party" he put a question mark. In drawing up the list of parties and groups invited to the First Congress of the Comintern, Lenin emphasized that the criterion could only be the practical position of the party or group concerned ("resolutely stands for a split with the social-patriots", "for the socialist revolution now and for the dictatorship of the proletariat", etc.)."in principle, for "Soviet power" and against the restriction of our work to bourgeois parliamentarism, against subordination to it", and "in no way can we take the "Zimmerwaldites" as a measure") 70 .

66 "Documente. 1917 - 1922", pp. 120 - 122; Al. Nicolau. Op. cit., p. 83.

67 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 37, p. 503.

68 Ibid., p. 506.

69 V. I. Lenin. Domocratia burgheza" si dictatura proletara. Editura Biuroului din Ukraina a International comuniste. Odessa. 1919. In the commentary to the Complete Works of V. I. Lenin, this edition is not taken into account, but the publications of the journal "Communist International" (1919, No. 1) and in German in the "Minutes" of the First Congress of the Comintern (1920) are indicated as the first publications in foreign languages. 37, p. 487.

70 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 50, pp. 228-229.

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The validity of this warning of V. I. Lenin is also evident from the position of the right wing of the SPR leadership at the beginning of 1919 (the"Declaration" of the Provisional Executive Committee of February 13). This position was characterized by opportunism, covered up with phrases about internationalism, about Zimmerwald.

At the First Congress of the Comintern. Rakovsky, together with V. I. Lenin and other participants of the Zimmerwald Conference, signed a statement stating that "the Zimmerwald association has outlived its usefulness" and proposed to liquidate it. Speaking at the congress, Rakovsky gave a brief outline of the development of the working-class movement in Romania. But speaking about the party's recent position, he said: "The Romanian party gradually developed into a communist party and accordingly called itself a communist party."71 . This statement by Rakovsky did not correspond to reality. Only in May 1921, after a long and stubborn struggle, was the Communist Party established. When discussing the immediate organization of the Third International, Rakovsky supported this proposal.

In his closing speech at the closing of the First Congress of the Comintern (March 6, 1919), V. I. Lenin noted that in the Eastern European countries "the movement in favor of the Soviets is spreading more and more widely, and this movement is nothing more than a movement for the creation of a new, proletarian democracy - it is the most significant step forward in the development of to the dictatorship of the proletariat, to the complete victory of communism. " 72
Lenin's report to the First Congress of the Comintern, " Bourgeois Democracy and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," was immediately translated into Romanian, printed as a separate pamphlet, 73 and sent for distribution to Romania. On August 24-26, 1919, the newspaper Socialismul published the text of this report in three issues. "Lenin's Report (on the dictatorship of the proletariat)" It was also published in the newspaper Revolutia Sociala, the organ of the Romanian Socialist Party of Hungary .74 The dissemination of Lenin's theses greatly helped the left in its struggle to propagate the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In the days when the First Congress of the Comintern began to meet, the Ploiesz organization of the SPR published on March 5 and 8, 1919, in the newspaper "Socialismul", the declaration "Socialism and the principle of national unity", in which, in particular, it stated that "the Socialist International can only be revived"... by excluding all nationalist opportunist parties." The Declaration required the socialists of the Old Kingdom (Romania within its pre-war borders), Transylvania, and Bukovina to "endorse without reservation the socialist, communist revolutionary principles" 75.

The creation of the Comintern intensified the process of disengagement in the SPR. The communist groups declared their approval of the documents of the Comintern and their desire to join it. They have established a close relationship with IKKI. The representative of the Comintern in Romania in 1919-1921 was A. Constantinescu. In 1920, a collection of Comintern documents, The Communist International, was published in Bucharest. In ka-

71 " The First Congress of the Comintern. March 1919". Moscow, 1933, p. 50, 118-119. In the first edition of the protocols: "gradually moved to communism" ("The First Congress of the Communist International. Protocols". Pg. 1921, p. 55). See also: "Communist International", 1919, N 4, stb. 555.

72 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 37, p. 511.

73 As mentioned above, V. I. Lenin's report "Bourgeois Democracy and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" was printed in the Romanian language in Odessa in the spring of 1919.

74 P. Constantinescu - Iasis. a. Op. cit, pp. 85, 87, 168.

75 "Documente. 1917 - 1922", pp. 136, 138.

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Excerpts from V. I. Lenin's work "The Third International and Its Place in History"77 were published in honor of the preface to it .

On April 16, 1919, the newspaper Socialismul published a translation of K. Kautsky's article " Theses for a Socialist Program of Action "under the title "Instructions to the program of Socialist Activity" .78 This was the preparation by the right and centrists of public opinion for the publication of a new (opportunist) version of the party's program.

On May 23-26, a conference of the JWS was held in Bucharest to address programmatic issues. The wavering part of the Executive Committee, in the name of unity, yielded to the opportunists, who found themselves in the majority .79 The decision taken at the conference contributed to the appearance of a program document that did not correspond to the actual level of development of the revolutionary movement in Romania. The December draft of the SPR program stated that "objective conditions have been created within capitalist society for its transformation" and that the Russian proletariat consciously used these objective conditions. It was pointed out that Western countries also have these objective conditions. The May Program, while recognizing that in the depths of capitalist society "both the material and spiritual elements and conditions necessary for the realization of a socialist society have been created and are becoming more and more firmly established," claimed, however, that Rumania is developing "under different conditions than Western countries", in a" different " feudal environment than in the West. on a social basis " 80 .

This conclusion actually led to such an absolutization of the national features of the Romanian historical process, which resulted in the denial of the manifestation in Romania of the main laws of historical development in the era of capitalism and imperialism. This, in turn, created a "theoretical basis" for the opportunists to ignore the international revolutionary experience and, above all, the experience of the revolution in Russia, the experience of the RCP (b).

The December draft referred to the international significance of October, stating that " The Socialist Party of Romania... I stand in solidarity with the Russian Communist Party and with all the socialist revolutionary parties of the world." In the May program of 1919, these provisions were removed. All that remained was the general phrase about solidarity "with the proletariat of all countries." The December project was "against class cooperation." In the May program, this call was removed. The December draft stated that " nationalist ideology hindered and delayed the development of the class consciousness of the proletariat ... and, consequently, the revolutionization of the masses." In the May program, this thesis was also removed. The December draft called for a struggle to"wrest political power from the hands of the Romanian bourgeoisie by any means necessary and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, with the realization of the communist ideal in mind." In the May program

77 "Documente. 1916 - 1921", p. 744; "Internationale Comunista. Manifestul sau. Principiile sale. Primul sau congres. Rezolufii s.i aderari". Sec^iunea Partidului socialist. Bucuresti. 1920, pp. 3 - 5.

78 K. Kautsky. Indrumari pentru un program de activitate socialists. " Socialismul (1919, N 64, 16 apr.). See Yu. M. Chernetsovsky. V. I. Lenin's struggle against the Kautskyite revision of Marxism. L. 1965, p. 85; his own. Lenin and the Struggle against International Revisionism. L. 1970, p. 162.

79 "Documente. 1916-1921", p. 199; "Communist International", 1921, N 16, stb. 3810.

80 "Documente. 1916-1921", pp. 126, 202. " The socio-feudal basis mentioned in the May program of the Socialist party, adopted at the conference in May 1919, - points out the commentary of the Institute of Historical and Socio-Political Studies under the Central Committee of the RCP, - reflects the influence of the concepts of K. Dobrogeanu-Geri, who overestimated feudal remnants in the Soviet period. Romania" (ibid., p. 743).

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the first part of this thesis ("wrest political power from the Romanian bourgeoisie by any means necessary") the last part ("with a view to the realization of the communist ideal") was replaced by the following: "to achieve the transformation of capitalist society into a socialist society." In the text of the new program, the word "revolution" was very rarely used, but one of its provisions stated that the proletariat "is called to fulfill a historical mission in the evolution of Romanian society." Criticism of reformism in the text of the May program was removed. Instead, a new thesis has emerged: "The course of reforms should be accelerated in order to achieve a state of social evolution." 81
The May 1919 program was certainly a political step backward from the December 1918 draft.

In the same May days, when the conference of the SPR adopted the "Declaration of Principles" in a new, degraded version, V. I. Lenin's article "The Third International and its Place in History" was published in the journal "Kommunisticheskiy Internatsionalny" (1919, No. 1). V. I. Lenin wrote that, having accepted all the best that he had learned, he was able to in the legacy of the Second International, the Comintern "cut off its opportunist, social-chauvinist, bourgeois and petty-bourgeois filth and began to implement the dictatorship of the proletariat." 82 This Leninist instruction that we must fight not only for the slogan, but also for the realization of the dictatorship of the proletariat, formed the basis for the further political activity of the Romanian left in their struggle for the creation of the Communist Party of Romania .

The left continued to propagate among the working people of Romania the revolutionary experience of Soviet Russia and the ideas of Leninism. On August 24, 25, and 26, 1919, the newspaper Socialismul published Lenin's "Theses and Report on Bourgeois Democracy and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" under the title "Bourgeois Democracy and Proletarian Democracy."84 Extensive propaganda of Marxism-Leninism was also organized in the publications of the Moscow and Odessa Romanian communist groups (the newspapers "Sclnteia", "Dezrobirea sociala", "Comunistul").

During this period, the left was beginning to understand that, along with the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the question of the peasantry was one of the decisive factors for the fate of the proletarian revolution. The draft " Declaration of Principles "(December 1918) provided for the"socialization of the earth" in the future. The May program limited itself to mentioning the need to "organize political education for rural workers..." and, following K. Dobrogeanu-Gerey, claimed that there was a "neo-feudal regime"in Romania .85 The authority of K. Dobrogeanu-Gehry, the still-outdated ideas drawn from the circle of ideas of the theory of "neo-feudalism", prevented the left from fully understanding the Russian experience and using it to correctly formulate the agrarian question in the conditions of their country.

A. Nicolau correctly wrote in his work "The Socialist Revolution in Romania" about the world-historical significance of the new state form - Soviets of Workers and Peasants. However, he underestimated V. I. Lenin's important point that the Bolsheviks and their supporters did not

81 "Documente. 1916 - 1921", pp. 125 - 127, 203 - 205.

82 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 38, p. 303.

83 "Lenin vazut de romani", p. 649.

84 P. Constantinescu-Iasis. a. Op. cit., p. 85. In 1919, this work of V. I. Lenin was also published as a separate pamphlet in the series "Library of the Communist" (V. Roman. Distribution of V. I. Lenin's works in Romania. "Publication and distribution of works by V. I. Lenin". Collection of articles and materials, Moscow, 1960, p. 313), and in 1920. it was published in the collection " Circle of the Socialist Publishing House "under the title" Bourgeois Democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat".

85 "Documente. 1916 - 1921", pp. 123, 202 - 203, 205.

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We did not forget about the alliance of "workers and the poorest peasants, semi-proletarians", which the Bolshevik party succeeded in "after October 25... to establish power on the basis of such a strong alliance. " 86 The lack of understanding of some essential aspects of Lenin's agrarian policy was also reflected in the fact that A. Nicolau, in the section "What did the Russian Socialist Revolution accomplish?", mentions only "the abolition of private ownership of land" and "the transfer of the exchange of industrial and agricultural products into the hands of the workers 'government", without explaining what actually gained as a result of the revolution the peasantry and why it, unlike previous revolutions, provided strong support for the policy of the proletariat, which was led by V. I. Lenin, the Bolsheviks.

A. Nicolau's observations on the course of the upcoming revolution 87 confirm not only his lack of understanding of the question of concrete ways to create a union of the proletariat and the peasantry, but also reflect his opinion on the need to create this union after the seizure of political power by the proletariat, which ignored the well-known ideas of the founders of Marxism-Leninism, according to seizure of power by the revolutionary proletariat and peasantry.

The interest of the Romanian left in the Russian experience of solving the agrarian question is also evidenced by the publication "Lenin's Speech. Russian Peasantry and Communism" (reprint made on December 31, 1919 by the newspaper "Socialismul" based on the materials of the newspaper "L'Humanite") 88 . The publication was an exposition of Lenin's main propositions, repeatedly repeated by V. I. Lenin in his " Report on Work in the Countryside "(at the Eighth Congress of the RCP (b) in March 1919), in his "Resolution on the Attitude towards the Middle Peasantry", in his speeches "On the candidacy of M. I. Kalinin for the post of Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee", " On middle peasants " 89 and other speeches.

The most important political event at the beginning of 1920 was the January decision of the Bucharest organization of the SPR, and then the organizations of Ploiesti, Cimpina, Galac, Braila and many other cities to support the demand to transform the SPR into a communist party and to join the Comintern. On January 25, 1920, at the annual general meeting of the Bucharest organization of the SPR, after a brief discussion, a resolution was adopted stating that " the Bucharest organization considers itself to have joined the Third International." In addition to this basic decision, the Bucharest organization decided to call on the Executive Committee to make the same declaration of joining the Comintern, subject to the approval of this declaration by the next party Congress .90 A leaflet issued on the same days on behalf of all communist groups called for an immediate solution to the question of creating a Communist party .91
In June 1920, the first issue of the magazine "Lupta de clasa", the organ of the Bucharest section of the SPR, was published. In the first issue of the magazine, an excerpt from Lenin's work "The State and the Revolution" was published under the title "Transition from capitalism to Communism" (2nd paragraph of the 5th chapter). In the editorial of this issue, the editorial board emphasized that the Third International is "growing before our eyes" and stated,

86 V. I. Leni n. PSS. Vol. 35, p. 262.

87 AI. Nicolau. Op. cit., pp. 36 - 37, 81.

88 See P. Constantinescu-Iasis. a. Op. cit., p. 88.

89 See V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 38, p. 4. 187 - 205, 207 - 210, 223 - 226, 236 - 237.

90 St. Musat. Op. cit., pp. 78 - 79; "Documente. 1916 - 1921", pp. 283, 302 - 303; "Documente. 1917 - 1922", pp. 100, 159, 163.

91 leaflets were signed by the "Central Committee of Communist Groups of Romania" ("Leaflets of the Communist Underground of Bessarabia, 1918-1940", Collection of documents. Chisinau. 1960, p. 27).

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that it considers its main task to propagate the ideas of communism, to fight against "opportunist, liberal or petty-bourgeois ideological infiltrations", and to fight against the class positions of the proletariat. In the second issue of the journal Lupta de clasa for 1920, the theses for the Second Congress of the Comintern "Tactics of the Third International", developed by the Western European Bureau of the Comintern in Berlin, were published. In the same issue, D. Fabian published an article " From Marx to Lenin (how a Social Democrat falsified Marxism)", directed against the right-wing social democrat Voyni. The author criticized the ideology of the right, relying on the conclusions of V. I. Lenin's work "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky". Continuing his article in the third issue of the magazine, D. Fabian showed the essence of the renegade position of the right, which goes to any forgery in order to slander the Bolsheviks and their leader V. I. Lenin. The magazine suggested that the Executive Committee of the SPR, following the example of the parties in Italy, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, etc., decide to join the Comintern, considering it abnormal that "18 months after the first congress of the Communist International, the socialist world does not yet know whether we have joined or not" (to the Comintern. "Evasion is the main characteristic of centrists," the magazine wrote....The committees, by evasion, give proof that, although they have the most communist intentions, they are actually centrist in political practice. " 92
* * *

In the spring of 1920, there was a heated discussion in the SPR about the status of the delegation that was to go to the Second Congress of the Comintern. The left considered that the refusal to participate in the congress would not correspond to the actual balance of power and the will of the majority of members of the SPR, and the position of the party leadership was considered "virtually centrist" 93 . The rightists and the centrists associated with them tended to send a delegation for "familiarization" purposes, as" guests " of the congress, rather than participants in it. The situation was very difficult. Under these circumstances, the party leadership sent a delegation to the Second Congress of the Comintern, instructing it to negotiate the SPR's entry into the Comintern.

The Second Congress of the Communist International (July 19 - August 7, 1920) discussed the most important questions of the international working-class movement. In July 1920, a draft of theses on the agrarian question was published in the journal Communist International, among several Lenin documents. The conditions for admission to the Comintern (21 conditions) were also printed. These two questions were of paramount importance to the Romanian labor movement.

The question of working out a correct political line in relation to the peasantry of the Balkan-Danube countries was raised by the Comintern as early as the beginning of 1920. "The victory and establishment of Soviet power in Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Turkey, and all the Balkan countries will depend on the ability of the Communists to extend the influence of the Communist Party to the peasant masses," the Comintern emphasized in its March 1920 address "To the Proletariat of the Balkan-Danube countries, to the Communist Parties of Bulgaria Romania, Serbia and Turkey " 94 .

In the election program published in May 1920, the SPR put forward a demand for "general expropriation of land, leaving small-scale land plots to be taken into account."

92 "Lupta de clasa", 1920, N 2, pp. 16, 45, 58 - 64; N 3, pp. 90 - 98; N 4, pp. 83, 139.

93 "Documente. 1917 - 1922", p. 183.

94 "Communist International", 1920, N 9, stb. 1405-1410.

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to the owners only as much as they can work together with the whole family", the requirement to transfer to the peasants all agricultural implements belonging to the landlords. However, the program did not encourage the peasants to form, expand, or strengthen a political alliance with the workers. Nor did it set a similar task for the Romanian proletariat. In a letter to the Southern Bureau of the Comintern, one of the leaders of the left, A. Constantinescu, acknowledged the weakness of revolutionary propaganda in the countryside and in the army, which was a very serious omission in conditions when the peasants "felt instinctively that it was necessary to join the workers from the cities" 95 . In these circumstances, as well as in the context of the intensification of the activities of the "Ceranist Party" and the "Averescu Party", 96 the SPR did not have a clear tactic for working in the countryside until the end of 1920.

In the draft of the "Agrarian Program of the Socialist-Communist Party of Romania" drawn up at the end of 1920, it was stated that "in an agrarian country, such as Romania, the experience of the victorious proletariat of Soviet Russia and the peasant masses there, which it (the proletariat) revolutionized, must become known..."97 For the first time in the history of the Romanian labor movement, a program document on the attitude towards the peasantry was developed. This document used the historical experience of the RCP (b). For the first time in the history of Romania, an attempt was made to approach the agrarian question from a Leninist perspective. This is due to A. Dobrogeanu, who was commissioned to prepare for the party congress the first Romanian agrarian program in a new, communist spirit.

After the Second Congress of the Comintern, the left increasingly began to turn to the works and speeches of V. I. Lenin. In the second half of 1920, the following articles were published: a review of V. I. Lenin's article "Heroes of the Berne International" with an outline of the main provisions of the article, a translation of V. I. Lenin's letter to Sylvia Pankhurst under the title "Lenin and Parliamentarism", an excerpt from V. I. Lenin's report to the VII Congress of the RCP (b) under the title " Bolshevik Communists and the middle peasant class"; a resolution on V. I. Lenin's report 98 was also published .

In October 1920, the General Council of the SPR approved the "Draft Charter of the Socialist-Communist Party" 99 . The first paragraph of the draft charter stated that the party operates on the basis of the principles of class struggle and international solidarity of workers, that its goal is to fight for political power, implement the dictatorship of the proletariat in the form of Soviets, socialize the means of production, and build a socialist society. The second paragraph stated that the party was a section of the Comintern. A party member was required to recognize the "principles, program, and means of struggle" of the party, and to be determined to "work for it to the best of their ability."100 The party was built on the principle of democratic centralism. The charter required strict discipline from top to bottom. The Charter did not define the congress as the highest body of the party, although it provided for its annual convocation. "The leadership of the party is entrusted to the Executive Committee," said article 25 of the charter. At the same time, the charter stipulated that the General Council should "control the activities of the Executive Committee"101 . The draft charter showed that some important provisions from among the leas are:-

95 "Documente. 1916 - 1921", pp. 384 - 386, 389.

96 A "peasant Party" of a petty-bourgeois type and a "people's party" headed by General Averescu, a representative of the bourgeois-landowner reaction.

97 "Documente. 1917 - 1922", p. 215.

98 "Lupta de clasa", 1920, NN 5, 6, 7, 8; "Lenin vazut de romanb, p. 120.

99 The draft approved by the General Council was published only on May 9, 1921 ("Documente. 1917 - 1922", p. 199).

100 "Documente. 1917 - 1922", p. 200.

101 Ibid., p. 205.

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The authors of the project did not yet understand the scientific and organizational principles of a new type of revolutionary party.

At the same time, in October 1920, the magazine Lupta de clasa wrote about the "great need to join the Third International", for which "all the organizations (sections) of the country have so far spoken out."102 The Bucharest organization demanded that the congress be convened as soon as possible. The Executive Committee appointed a party congress for January 7, 1921. This decision was not implemented in a timely manner due to the fault of the centrists.

In determining the position of the masses in relation to the convocation of the Congress, the creation of the Communist Party of Romania, and the accession to the Third International, the events of the general strike of 1920 and its lessons were of great importance. In 1919 and 1920, the strike movement grew in Romania. Whereas in 1919 there were 250 major strikes in the country, in 1920 there were 345 strikes between March 1 and October 20, 112 of them in Bucharest. In the autumn of 1920, a series of major strikes broke out in Romania. By October 20, most of the workers were on strike. The total number of participants in the general strike reached 400 thousand people. In the fight against the strike movement, the authorities arrested many party and trade union leaders, and the provisional leadership of the SPR and trade unions was created. It negotiated with the Government and on October 25 announced the end of the strike .103
The ECCI rightly noted that it was only because of the indecisive and opportunistic position of the SPR Executive Committee that "it was not difficult for the Romanian government to suppress the spontaneous revolutionary movement (strikes, etc.) that engulfed hundreds of thousands of Romanian workers."104
A leaflet signed "Group of members of the Socialist Party", along with the successes, noted: now "it is necessary for the party to join the Third International, turning it into a communist Party", because "the party has proved incapable of leading the broad masses" 105 .

The analysis of events led the left once again to the correct conclusion about the need to strengthen the ranks of the vanguard of the proletariat, about the need to create a party of Communists. In the leaflet "To the Workers and Peasants of Romania", published in the autumn of 1920, the leftists wrote that the success of the revolution depends on "the degree of preparation of the working class, the peasantry and the army", and in conclusion recalled the main condition: "The Communist Party must stand at the head of the workers and peasants." 106
After the defeat of the October general strike, the left wing of the SPR correctly concluded that it was necessary to accelerate the creation of the Communist Party. The first important step on this path was an underground meeting of communist groups on November 16, 1920, which drew up special directives. "Directives concerning the organization of the activities of communist groups" were a program document that defined the goals, forms of movement, and tactics on a number of issues. The document stated that it was "not a program of the future Communist Party" and that it should be considered only as a "practical program", a "program of action". The introduction stated that all communist groups were "in favour of joining the Comintern immediately and without any reservations", and that "the' centralism ' and 'discipline' that prevail and are necessary for this International are accepted". The text of the Directives detailed Lenin's statement

102 "Lupta de clasa", 1920, N 7, p. 242.

103 St. Musat. Miscarea muncitoreasca in anii avintului revolutionar. Crearea Partidului Comunist Roman (1918-1921). "Anale de istorie", 1969, N 3, pp. 75, 78; "History of modern and contemporary Romania", p. 174; "History of Romania", Moscow, 1950, p. 460.

104 "Communist International", 1921, N 16, stb. 3815-3816.

105 "Documente. 1916 - 1921", p. 537.

106 Central Museum of the Revolution of the USSR, GIK, N 27041/54.

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the question of the "basic law of revolution", explaining that "for its realization it is necessary that the majority of the working people deeply understand the necessity of revolution and be ready to die for it" 107 .

The Romanian policy documents, including the "Directives", did not specifically address the nature of the upcoming revolution. It remained undeveloped. It still had to be solved correctly, in a Leninist way. The experience of the revolutionary struggle abroad, and even in Romania itself, made it more and more clear that it was impossible to solve all the problems of a deep social revolution "in one fell swoop", if there were no real opportunities to "organize" the revolution and carry it out at once as a socialist revolution. Lovers of "cavalry attacks" and" lightning-fast victories " in Lenin's "Infantile Disease "of leftism" in communism " were reminded that in the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat, victory over the bourgeoisie is impossible "without a long, persistent, desperate war to the death - a war that requires endurance,endurance, and self-control. discipline, firmness, inflexibility, and unity of will " 108 . The Directives emphasized that a revolution is possible only when the broad masses are prepared to participate actively and consciously in it. The Directives expounded this important idea, supporting it with a reference to Lenin's words: "the masses need their own political experience," and linked it to the lessons of the general strike. The " Directives "also recalled Lenin's words that, as long as there are national differences, it is necessary to take into account national peculiarities in tactics while preserving"the basic principles of communism (the system of Soviets and the dictatorship of the " .109

On the question of the attitude towards the peasantry, the task was to support the revolutionary peasantry, to carry out communist propaganda in the countryside, and to explain that the proletariat should play a leading role and help the peasantry. This part of the " Directives "had a direct reference to the 21 conditions of admission to the Comintern, In accordance with the requirements of the" 21 conditions "in the" Directives "it was written:"The Executive Committee should consist only of Communists, people who are energetic, conscious and ready to make sacrifices." 110 An analysis of the text of the Directives shows that the document recorded the determination of the left to take responsibility for all the work of organizing a new party.

However, in the Socialist Party of Romania, as the left ironically noted, the situation was such that "we had to wait with our demand for joining until Fluerasz, Grigorovich, Zhumanka and Co. ... became inspired adherents of communism" 111 .

The delegation sent by the SPR Executive Committee to Moscow was traveling "to agree on joining the Communist International." The delegation included G. Cristescu, A. Dobrogeanu, D. Fabian, K. Popovic, E. Rozvan, I. Fluerasz. Representatives of the ICCI refused to negotiate with Fluerash. Both members of the Romanian delegation and representatives of the ECCI recognized that Fluerasz was politically responsible for cooperating with the bourgeoisie in the Ruling Council of Transylvania (Provisional Government of Transylvania), as well as for approving the Romanian intervention in the Hungarian Soviet Republic .112 The position of the ECCI and the Romanian left was politically correct. Delayed until early December in Moscow

107 "Documente. 1916 - 1921", pp. 546 - 548.

108 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 41, p. 6.

109 "Documente. 1916 - 1921", pp. 549 - 550.

110 Ibid., pp. 550 - 552.

111 "Communist International", 1921, N 16. stb. 3824.

112 Al. Dobrogeanu-Cherea. Cum l-am vazut pe Lenin. "Socialismub. 27.I.1924.

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A. Dobrogeanu, K. Popovich and G. Cristescu were received on December 10, 1920 by V. I. Lenin in the Kremlin, in the building of the Council of People's Commissars 113 .

V. I. Lenin used concrete examples to explain to the Romanian delegates the fallacy of denying the possibility of compromise with the bourgeoisie in the interests of developing the revolution. The opportunists considered compromises to be a departure of the RCP (b) and the Soviet government from the revolutionary path. V. I. Lenin, recalls A. Dobrodzhana, patiently and in detail explained the incorrectness of these accusations. He explained that it was the opportunists who were responsible for slowing down the revolutionary process. Lenin pointed out that these accusations, which are made by the opportunists, are essentially turned against them, and stressed that the critics still have to prove that "concessions" are not necessary under the dictatorship of the proletariat. V. I. Lenin, notes A. Dobrodzhanu, explained the problem of international duties on the example of the Russian proletariat: "The Russian proletariat and the peasantry have finally conquered their homeland. By protecting it from all reaction, they are protecting the future homeland of all mankind. " V. I. Lenin stressed that only the revolutionary path can lead the workers of other countries out of the impasse into which capitalism has led them.

At a meeting of the ECCI on November 11, 1920, the Romanian delegation was asked, among other questions, about disagreements within the party. When the left, at the request of the ECCI, gave such information, it turned out that, according to the left, there was a process of dividing currents in the SPR, that there were two parties in Romania that were in the process of forming: the Social Democratic party with the right wing (Grigorovich, Fluerasz, Dunareanu) and the "wing of the centrists" (Pistiner, Voynya, Gelerter) and communist (A. Dobrogeanu, Fabian, Olteanu, Stefanov) with the "anti-parliamentary left wing" (A. Constantinescu, Gr. Teodorescu). The middle position between these parties, according to the left, was occupied by "a group of leaders sitting between two chairs" (I. Moscovici, G. Cristescu, K. Popovic), which now "owns the leadership of the party" 114 . As further historical events have shown, this characterization was mostly correct.

The left self-critically noted the presence of the "communist-Marxist current" of the SPD of the disease "leftism" - a group whose main slogan was anti-parliamentarism. They considered this group to be "tactically flexible" and its members "determined and courageous" , and admitted that they themselves were "somewhat united" with this group. The left also self-criticised itself for "not fulfilling its military duties within the party in a timely manner and mainly not firmly enough", and was aware of "the need to redouble efforts to make up for lost time" 115.

The SPR delegation in the negotiations with the ECCI noted that the conditions for admission to the Comintern are generally accepted. However, as a result of centrist pressure, a reservation was made: the Delegation "reserves only certain clarifications in relation to paragraphs 3 to 7, 16 and 20..." 116 . These were conditions that spoke of the need to create a parallel illegal apparatus and combine legal work with illegal work.

113 The date of reception is confirmed by the entry of the secretary V. I. Lenin on the calendar sheet: "room affairs. 12.40 pm" (photocopy published. See A. Deac, A. Ilincioiu. Lenin si Romania. Bucuresti. 1970. Appendix, p. 8). See also: R. Z. Yunitskaya. Some facts from the biography of V. I. Lenin. Voprosy istorii CPSU, 1964, No. 11, pp. 62-64. G. Cristescu was late for the meeting with V. I. Lenin, came at the very end and practically did not participate in the conversation (Al. Dobrogeanu-Cherea. Op. cit.).

114 "Communist International", 1921, N 16, stb. 3824-3826.

115 Ibid., stb. 3825.

116 "Marea Revolufie Socialists din Octombrie si Miscarea Revolutionary si Democratica din Romania. Documente si amintiri". Bucuresti. 1967, p. 160.

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(condition 3), on systematic propaganda in the army (condition 4), on systematic and planned agitation in the countryside (condition 5), on the need to expose social-patriotism and social-chauvinism (condition 6), on the need for a complete and absolute break with reformism and centrism (condition 7), that all parties are bound by the decisions of the Comintern and the ECCI (Condition 16), and that the Central Committee of the Communist Parties and other central institutions of the parties must include "at least two-thirds of those comrades who, even before the Second Congress of the Communist International, publicly and unequivocally expressed their support for joining the Third Congress of the Communist International." International " 117 . The discussion in Moscow by the delegation of the SPR "21 conditions"and the party's position on joining the Comintern showed that there is still a stubborn struggle with the right and centrists.

After the return of the SPR delegation from Soviet Russia to Romania, the ideological struggle in the party intensified even more. The centrists in the party and its leadership insisted on preserving the 1919 program. The struggle continued at the meeting of the Party Executive Committee and the General Commission of Trade Unions on January 30-February 2, 1921. 12 representatives of the centrists voted against 18 representatives of the left (the right received 8 votes)118 . The sharp struggle that had flared up over the organization of the Communist Party and joining the Comintern continued, but the question of calling a congress in the near future was already a foregone conclusion. On March 3-6, 1921, the Romanian communist groups (there were already over 50 of them) held a conference in Iasi. This conference formed a "contact center" for the leadership of communist groups in different regions of Romania.

The struggle with the centrists everywhere gave victory to the left wing. The party sent to the congress mainly supporters of the communist orientation, supporters of the ideas of V. I. Lenin. The Congress was to hear a report, a report of the delegation that had returned from Russia, discuss the question of joining the Comintern and the party's program, discuss the agrarian question, the national question, questions about the party press, propaganda, changes in the party's charter, and others. The Congress sessions began on May 8, 1921, in the editorial hall of the newspaper "Socialismul". Comrades who were imprisoned were elected to the honorary Presidium. At the congress, it became clear that the majority of delegates represented revolutionary forces. It was decided to create a new party. The party was called "socialist-communist". The Congress received greetings from the Communist International and conveyed greetings from the Inter-Balkan Communist Federation and the Communist Party of Hungary. Resolutions "For peace, against war", "For amnesty", "Appeal to political prisoners" and a number of other documents were adopted.

A sharp struggle developed at the congress on a number of important issues. The SPR Executive Committee was sharply criticized for ignoring the revolutionary potential of the peasantry, for following the right-wing opportunist and centrist ideology in the question of the alliance of the working class with the peasantry. Theories about the necessity of proletarianization of the majority of peasants as a condition for the victory of socialism in Romania were also criticized .119

The Romanian centrists objected to the 16th condition of admission to the Communist International ("All decisions of the congresses of the Communist International, as well as the decisions of its Members-

117 "The Communist International in Documents", Moscow, 1932, p. 104.

118 "Documente. 1916-1921", p. 569.

119 Fl. Dragne. Pozitia miscarii muncitoresti din Romania fata de Jaranime in perioada 1918 - 1921. "Analele...", 1964, N 3, pp. 72 - 73.

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all parties that are members of the Communist International"), demanded independence within the Comintern, and insisted on the non-binding nature of its decisions. Centrist T. Iordekescu said at the congress that " in case of joining with reservations, it will be possible to fight against measures that do not correspond to your point of view." Meanwhile, in paragraph 16 of the conditions, where it was stated that the Comintern "must be built much more centrally than it was in the Second International", it was further stated that the Communist International and its Executive Committee must, of course, take into account in all their work the whole variety of conditions under which the Comintern can be organized. which different parties have to fight and act on, and make generally binding decisions only on issues where such decisions are possible. " 120
The fourth and fifth days were entirely devoted to discussing the question of joining the Comintern. The majority of delegates to the First Congress of the Communist Party of Romania unconditionally accepted 21 conditions for admission to the Comintern. The centrists did not dare to vote against, saying that they were in favor of joining, but with some reservations. The majority of delegates (428) voted for unconditional membership of the Communist International 121 . In the hall, the slogans "Long live the Third International!"were proclaimed.. The delegates sang "Internationale".

Among the documents adopted by the congress was a special appeal "To the Russian Proletariat", in which the congress indicated that " one of its first and most sacred duties is to express its deep admiration for the Russian proletariat ...which is now the vanguard of the world proletariat in its struggle for liberation from capitalist oppression. Long live the Republic of Soviets! " 122 .

On May 12, in the afternoon, gendarmes entered the courtroom by order of the Minister of Internal Affairs Argetoyan. All the delegates who voted for the creation of the Communist Party of Romania and for joining the Third International without reservations were arrested and taken to prisons for political prisoners in Zilava and Vecaresti. A few months later, a trial was organized against the delegates of the congress.

Under these circumstances, the centrists, while continuing their struggle against the Communist Party, are once again trying to attract workers to their side. In December 1921. they publish the preface to V. I. Lenin's book "The Infantile Disease of 'Leftism' in Communism, "published in a separate pamphlet .123 The preface criticized the decision of the Congress to join the Comintern unconditionally, and approved the position of the centrists at the congress .124 The preface quoted Lenin's famous statement about the political party's attitude to its mistakes, and then suggested applying Lenin's criticism of" leftism " to the decision of the First Congress of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the majority of whose delegates adopted a resolution on unconditional membership in the Comintern.

The Communists strongly condemned the centrists ' position at the congress and their behavior after the congress. In a" Proclamation to local Communist Groups, " prominent Romanian communist Leonte Filipescu branded the right-wing "people favored by General Siguran."-

120 "The Communist International in Documents", p. 103; " Documente. 1916 - 1921", pp. 713 - 715.

121,111 centrists voted for joining the Comintern with reservations.

122 "Documente. 1916-1921", p. 685.

123 V. I. Lenin. "Stingismul" boala copileriei comunismului Bucuresti. Ed. "Gugetarea". 1921 (Curtile de educate sociala). Abbreviated translation.

124 "Lenin vazut de Romani", p. 187.

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Central Asia (political police), together with those who give them a hand and call themselves "centrists"125 .
Despite the white terror and the attacks of opportunists, the First Congress of the Communist Party had a great influence on the further development of the communist movement in the country. The decisions of the First Congress of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation were "a triumph of the revolutionary current over the right and centrist trends" .126 The First Congress of the Communist Party of Romania, by its decisions, had a great influence on all subsequent ideological and political activities of the Romanian Communists. Although the influence of the prejudices and dogmas of the Second International and the opportunist theories of K. Dobrogeanu-Gehry long delayed the transformation of the tactics of the SDPR (SPR) into the tactics of the proletarian party truly contemporary with the Great October Revolution, the victory was palpable. At the same time, the burden of old remnants was not completely overcome in 1921, when the Communist Party was formed. This process dragged on for another decade.

There was another feature of the development of the Romanian revolutionary process, which left its mark on the activities of the Communist Party, especially in the first decade of its existence. These are difficulties connected with the implementation of the policy of an alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry. In addition to the shortcomings in the party's own activities, it was also affected by the fact that during the revolutionary upsurge of 1918-1920, a Centralist (peasant) party was formed. At that time, it made demagogic demands for a "joint struggle between the proletariat and the peasantry" and demands for a "radical revision of agrarian reform", and although these same demands were soon rejected by the Centralist leaders, the social illusions they created made it difficult to establish an alliance between the peasantry and the proletariat for a long time .127
The Communist Party also experienced great difficulties in the fight against opportunists. In this struggle, the Communist Party received help from the Comintern and other fraternal parties. The Communist Party followed the path of a close alliance between the Romanian proletariat and the international communist movement, educating the working class in the spirit of internationalist traditions of proletarian revolutionary solidarity.

* * *

The long and difficult struggle for the creation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union culminated in a great victory in May 1921. But there were still battles to be fought for the waverers, battles with ideological opponents within the working-class movement to create a mass, strong party of the Leninist type. The process of further development of the Communist Party as a new type of party was rather complicated. This process, in the concrete conditions of the then Romanian reality, was associated with overcoming a number of serious difficulties, including eliminating the influence of reformism and centrism, which in the past had deep roots in the ranks of the Romanian labor movement.

The revolutionary experience of the Bolsheviks and the ideas of V. I. Lenin greatly helped the development of the Romanian workers ' and communist movement during these years. Having come out of a difficult period of difficulties with the help of the ECCI in the late 1920s, the CPR managed to prepare its cadres for the Fifth Party Congress held in 1931 in the difficult conditions of the underground. At this historic congress, the Communist Party was purged of the influence of opportunistic power.-

125 "Documente din istoria partidului comunist si a miscarii muncitoresti revolutionare din Romania (mai 1921 - august 1924)". Bucuresti. 1970, p. 30.

126 "Documente. 1916 - 1921", p. 5.

127 See A. A. Yazkov. Romania on the eve of World War II. 1934-1939, Moscow, 1963, p. 27.
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It developed a program of revolutionary strategy and tactics, which provided it with a broad link with the masses in fulfilling its main task: to complete the bourgeois-democratic transformations in the country and move on to the socialist revolution.

In the 1930s, during the Communist Party's struggle against fascism and the preparation of an anti-Soviet war, the party strengthened itself organizationally and established close ties with the broad masses. This allowed her to become the head of the anti-fascist struggle of the Romanian people. The Communist Party pursued an internationalist policy of supporting the Soviet Union and its army during World War II.

For their part, the workers of the Soviet Union also fulfilled their international duty. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers fell in fierce battles for the liberation of Romania, crushing German and Romanian fascism, creating conditions for the long-awaited freedom of the fraternal Romanian people. The memory of the heroes who fell in the struggle against fascism, Romanian historians note, will remain forever indelible .128
The Communist Party's revolutionary strategy and tactics gave it a leading role in the popular revolution. The victory of the socialist revolution in Romania once again proved the loyalty and invincibility of Lenin's teaching - the international teaching of the international proletariat. History has proved the correctness of the line adopted by the Romanian Communists in the post - October period-the line of struggle against opportunism and nationalism, the line of struggle for the revolutionary program of the party, for studying and using the experience of the CPSU and other fraternal parties, the experience of the Soviet State, and for loyalty to Lenin's revolutionary principles of proletarian internationalism.

128 I. Popescu-Putsuri, G. Stoica, I. Radulescu. The Great October Socialist Revolution and the Labor Movement in Romania, Moscow, 1967, p. 111.

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